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TRUMPING THE NINTH CIRCUIT: HOW THE 45TH PRESIDENT’S SUPREME COURT 
APPOINTMENTS WILL STRENGTHEN THE ALREADY STRONG FEDERAL POLICY FAVORING 
ARBITRATION 
By 
Eric Schleich* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 The Supreme Court was left essentially divided along political lines after the tragic 
passing of the late Justice Antonin Scalia on February 13, 2016.1 A Hillary Clinton victory 
in the 2016 presidential election could have swung the Court to a liberal majority, assuming 
that her nominee(s) would have been approved by a Republican-controlled Senate.2 Now, 
with a Donald Trump presidential victory and Republican control of the Senate, America 
will see at least one, and possibly multiple,3 conservative justices appointed to the Supreme 
Court over the next four to eight years, establishing a right-leaning Court.4 Should these 
justices stay consistent with their conservative colleagues and predecessors, and follow the 
Court’s recent arbitration precedent, they are likely to continue the Court’s current 
interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) establishing a “[strong] federal 
policy favoring arbitration.”5  
 This article will examine the impact of the 2016 presidential election on arbitration 
jurisprudence. Specifically, this article will examine how the Supreme Court will address 
concerns regarding the validity and enforceability of adhesive arbitration clauses and class 
action waivers in consumer and employment arbitration. This article will also discuss the 
Supreme Court precedent interpreting the FAA, the current status of the law, and the 
Supreme Court’s most important cases protecting contracts of adhesion and class action 
waivers from adverse state laws. Finally, this article will explore how President Trump can 
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1  Matthew Tonis, U.S. Supreme Court becomes a court divided after death of Justice Antonin Scalia, 
CRONKITE NEWS (Feb. 15, 2016), https://cronkitenews.azpbs.org/2016/02/15/u-s-supreme-court-becomes-a-
court-divided-after-death-of-justice-antonin-scalia/. 
2 Rebecca Shabad, How could the next president reshape the Supreme Court?, CBS NEWS (Jan. 5, 2016), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-next-president-could-reshape-the-supreme-court/. 
3 Id. (stating that there could be as many as four Supreme Court vacancies in the coming years). 
4 Jeffrey Rosen, How President Trump Could Reshape the Supreme Court – and the Country, POLITICO 
MAGAZINE (Nov. 13, 2016), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/11/donald-trump-wins-supreme-
court-214449.  
5 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011); see THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 
584 (7th ed. 2015) (“[T]he court perceives the issue in political terms.”). 
build a conservative, arbitration-friendly Supreme Court, and how this will affect the future 
of consumer and employment arbitration law. 
II.  THE STRONG FEDERAL POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION  
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Interpreting the FAA  
The Supreme Court, in more than forty-five arbitration cases over the last forty to 
fifty years, has been nearly unwavering in its support for arbitration.6 In this support, the 
Court has added significantly to the content and function of the FAA, transforming what 
was originally a mere federal procedural statute into a substantive federal arbitration law 
binding on federal and state courts.7 This process is popularly referred to as federalization, 
or federalism.8 At the heart of this development is the Federalism Trilogy, a series of three 
cases in successive terms in the 1980’s in which the Court clarified the policy underlying 
its arbitration doctrine.9 An overview of the Trilogy will highlight the fact that it was the 
Supreme Court, and not Congress, that crafted the federal policy on arbitration as it exists 
today, and provide the groundwork upon which the Court has based its more provocative 
holdings in recent years.  
Through Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,10 
Southland Corp. v. Keating11 and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,12 the Court identified 
in the FAA a strong federal policy favoring arbitration, and a congressional command to 
the courts to enforce it.13 The Court employed three overreaching concepts to expand the 
                                                 
6 CARBONNEAU, supra note 5, at vi (citing Stolt-Neilsen v AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010), 
Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576 (2008), Volt Info. Sciences v. Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468 
(1989), and Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968) as the Court’s 
primary deviations from its general support of arbitration and arbitrability). 
7 Michael J. Yelnosky, Fully Federalizing the Federal Arbitration Act, 90 OR. L. REV. 729, 735 (2012) 
(describing the federalization of the FAA, focusing on the savings clause); compare Bernhardt v. Polygraphic 
Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 200-01, 205 (1956) (holding that the FAA could not dislodge the application 
of state law in federal court per Erie, because it was a federal procedural enactment, and only applies to 
arbitration agreements concerning transactions involving commerce) with Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25 
(“The effect of the section is to create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any 
arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.”). 
8 Yelnosky, supra note 7, at 735.  
9 CARBONNEAU, supra note 5, at 166. 
10 Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. 1. 
11 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
12 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985). 
13 31 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 905.03 (3d ed. 1999). 
reach of the FAA: 1) the plenary power of Congress under the Commerce Clause; 2) the 
preemption of state law by federal law under the Supremacy Clause; and 3) the 
constitutional power of Congress to direct the conduct of federal courts.14  
In Moses H. Cone, the Court found that the effect of section 2 of the FAA is to 
“create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration 
agreement within the coverage of the act,”15 which governs the issue of arbitrability in 
either state or federal court. 16  This marks an important milestone in arbitration 
jurisprudence, as the Court announced that the FAA creates a body of federal substantive 
law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet the statute 
does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction.17 The Court then built on 
this and its holding in Prima Paint v. Flood Conklin18 when it ruled in Southland that 
Congress not only mandated the enforcement of arbitration agreements that fall within the 
coverage of the FAA, but that this mandate is not “subject to any additional limitations 
under state law.”19 The ultimate effect of Southland is that state statutory law precluding 
the arbitration of a state law claim is preempted by § 2 of the FAA.20 
Byrd is the final case of the Trilogy, and the one with the most limited continuing 
precedential value due to the Court later overruling an earlier position establishing the 
underlying premise of the case.21 Here, the Court ruled that where some claims presented 
within a case are subject to arbitration and others are not, the FAA nonetheless commands 
that the agreement to arbitrate be given effect.22  The concerns created by the separation of 
claims cannot overcome the express statutory mandate for arbitration.23 
                                                 
14 MOORE ET AL, supra note 13, ¶ 905.03.  
15 Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24. 
16 Id. at 24-25. 
17 Id.; Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy, the Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. 
REV. 1305, 1341 (1985). 
18 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood Conklin, 388 U.S. 395, 403, 406-07 (1967) (holding that, on the issue of 
whether a claim of fraud in the inducement of a contract was to be resolved by the federal court as a diversity 
action, or by the arbitrators pursuant to the parties’ “Consulting Agreement,” the matter should go to 
arbitration).  
19 MOORE ET AL, supra note 13, ¶ 905.03; Southland, 465 U.S. at 11; see Yelnosky, supra note 7, at 740 
(“The Court announced in Prima Paint that its ‘severability’ doctrine . . . is a creature of federal law that 
governs notwithstanding state law to the contrary.”). 
20 MOORE ET AL, supra note 13, ¶ 905.03. 
21 Id. (“[A]n underlying premise in the Byrd case was that the federal securities claim were not subject to 
arbitration . . . however, that premise was later . . . overruled.”); see also Byrd, 470 U.S. 213.  
22 MOORE ET AL, supra note 13, ¶ 905.03; Byrd, 470 U.S. at 218. 
23 MOORE ET AL, supra note 13, ¶ 905.03; Byrd, 470 U.S. at 218. 
The Court rewrote the express content of the FAA through these cases, “articulating 
a federal policy extending to issues well beyond its literal terms.”24 The Court established 
the FAA and the enforceability of arbitration agreements as a rule of national application, 
extended to state courts and legislatures. 25  All statutes and litigation that implicate 
arbitration must now conform to the provisions and underlying policy of the FAA, or 
otherwise be defeated by the strong federal policy favoring arbitration.26  
B. The Current Status of the Law  
 The Court has been committed to upholding the strong federal policy favoring 
arbitration.27 As stated earlier, the Court has been nearly unwavering in its support for 
arbitration. 28  Orlando Distinguished Professor of Law and Penn State Law Professor 
Thomas E. Carbonneau described the current state of arbitration jurisprudence in the 
United States as a “golden era.”29 With the strong federal policy established, the Court has 
expanded the jurisdiction of arbitration and the FAA to areas such as the purchase of 
securities, employment disputes, statutory rights, and federal civil liberties. 30  This 
campaign to expand the jurisdiction of arbitration “was waged to create a disciplined, 
uniform, and unambiguous regulation of arbitration” with the ultimate goal being a 
workable system of civil adjudication and justice in U.S. society.31  
                                                 
24 Hirshman, supra note 17, at 1353. 
25 CARBONNEAU, supra note 5, at vii; MOORE ET AL, supra note 13, ¶ 905.03. 
26 MOORE ET AL, supra note 13, ¶ 905.03. 
27 CARBONNEAU, supra note 5, at vii. 
28 Id. at vi. 
29 Id. at vii-viii (“The court sustains every aspect of the operation of the arbitral process in both the domestic 
and transborder sphere. Doctrine is adapted to achieve the objectives of policy; everything is sacrificed to 
bring about an accessible form of adjudicatory justice.”) 
30 CARBONNEAU, supra note 5, at v; see Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 
477, 481-83 (1989) (ruling that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act of 1993 
are enforceable because the provisions of the Act which grant venue to the federal courts may be waived); 
see Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (holding that the employment contract exclusion 
applies only to employment contracts of workers directly involved in interstate transport of goods and 
services); see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628–39 (1985) (holding 
that an anti-trust dispute arising from an international commercial transaction was arbitrable); see 14 Penn 
Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 251 (2009) (holding that collective bargaining agreements that require 
union members to arbitrate ADEA claims are enforceable).  
31 CARBONNEAU, supra note 5, at vii. 
 This progression has not been without criticism, however; the Court’s 
federalization of the FAA has been “much maligned.” 32  Judges, lawmakers, and 
commentators have expressed concerns about the expansion of the FAA into areas 
Congress may have never intended, pre-emption of state laws, and the unfair nature of 
certain agreements.33 Some of the most significant diversions from the Supreme Court’s 
arbitration policy have come from Democratic lawmakers, California state courts and the 
Ninth Circuit.34 
 
 
III. EXPANDING THE STRONG FEDERAL POLICY  FAVORING ARBITRATION  
 
 The most controversial rulings in arbitration law today center upon the validity and 
enforceability of adhesive arbitration agreements, many of which contain class action 
waivers.35  Many view these agreements as inherently unfair, allowing more powerful 
parties (usually wealthy businesses) to dominate weaker parties (consumers and 
employees), essentially denying them the right to sue as a class.36 The rejection of this form 
of agreement is most prominent in the California legislature, as well as California state and 
federal courts, which have viewed such agreements as unconscionable and unfair.37 The 
                                                 
32 Yelnosky, supra note 7, at 730. 
33 Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 
77 N.C.L. REV. 931, 936 (1999) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s expansive doctrines, when applied to consumer 
transactions, contravene the [FAA’s] intent and undermine many important due process and substantive 
rights.”); see, e.g., Southland, 465 U.S. at 22-23 (O’Connor, S.D., dissenting) (“The Court’s decision is 
impelled by an understandable desire to encourage the use of arbitration, but it utterly fails to recognize the 
clear congressional intent underlying the FAA.”); see also Arbitration Fairness Act, S. 537, 115th Cong. 
(2017) (Introduced by Senator Al Franken on March 7, 2017, this Act aims to prohibit a pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement from being valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an employment, consumer, 
antitrust, or civil rights dispute). 
34 CARBONNEAU, supra note 5, at 584 (“California state courts . . . have displayed considerable resistance to 
embracing . . . the ‘emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration.’”); see S. 537; William C. Martucci, 
California courts breathe renewed life into unconscionability arguments against the enforcement of 
employment arbitration agreements, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 7, 2013), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=d6fa6c1a-d935-44a9-8c5e-83bc95f80654. 
35 Accord CARBONNEAU, supra note 5, at v. 
36  David Lazarus, Bill aims to restore consumers’ right to sue, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Oct. 18, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/18/business/la-fi-lazarus-20111018; see generally Ronald G. 
Aronovsky, The Supreme Court and the Future of Arbitration: Towards a Preemptive Federal Arbitration 
Procedural Paradigm?, 42 SW. L. REV. 131, 152-53 (2012) (stating that there are many reasons a business 
would want to include arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts, one of which is to avoid class action 
litigation). 
37 CARBONNEAU, supra note 5, at v. 
California and Ninth Circuit courts “have displayed considerable resistance to embracing 
arbitration and the ‘emphatic federal policy supporting arbitration.’”38  
 The Court’s decisions in class arbitration cases laid important groundwork for its 
later cases involving contracts of adhesion.39 The Court first addressed class arbitration 
under the FAA in Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle,40 and Stolt-Neilsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
International Corp.,41 arising in South Carolina and the Second Circuit, respectively.42 In 
Bazzle, an arbitration clause in loan contracts between Green Tree, homeowners, and 
purchasers of mobile homes provided for arbitration of all contract-related disputes, but 
made no mention of class-wide arbitration.43 The South Carolina State Supreme Court held 
that the contracts permitted class arbitration since the clauses were silent on that matter.44 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that this was a question for the arbitrator to 
decide.45 The significance of this case is that no Justice suggested that the FAA prohibited 
class arbitration, and class arbitration proceedings actually became more common 
following Bazzle.46 
 The Court next addressed class arbitration in Stolt-Neilsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l 
Corp., where it considered “whether imposing class arbitration on parties whose arbitration 
clauses are ‘silent’ on that issue is inconsistent with the [FAA].”47 Here, claimants sought 
to bring class-wide arbitration against the owners of parcel tanker ships under agreements 
that did not expressly address class arbitration.48 The parties entered into an agreement 
allowing a three-arbitrator panel to settle the issue, which ruled that class arbitration was 
permissible. 49  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that “a party may not be 
compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis 
                                                 
38 Id. at 584.  
39 See Aronovsky, supra note 36, at 152. 
40 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
41 Stolt-Neilsen, 559 U.S. 662. 
42 Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, Stolt-Neilsen, 559 U.S. 662. 
43 Bazzle, 539 U.S at 448. 
44 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 351 S.C. 244, 265 (2002). 
45 Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451, 454. 
46 Aronovsky, supra note 36, at 154 (citing Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and 
Procedure, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1103, 1139 (observing that class arbitration became widespread after Bazzle)).  
47 Stolt-Neilsen, 559 U.S. at 666. 
48 Id. at 667-68. 
49 Id. at 668-69. 
for concluding that the party agreed to do so.”50 An important part of Justice Alito’s 
opinion was that “the differences between bilateral and class-action arbitration are too great 
for arbitrators to presume . . . that the parties’ mere silence on the issue of class-action 
arbitration constitutes consent to resolve their disputes in class proceedings.”51 This was a 
deviation from the Court’s holding in Bazzle, and distinguished class arbitration from 
bilateral arbitration.52 This differentiation of class arbitration and bilateral arbitration “laid 
the groundwork for . . . Concepcion.”53 
 While there are a number of cases that reveal the California courts’ views on this 
subject, a landmark case in this area and one that best illustrates the conflict is AT&T 
Mobility v. Concepcion.54 In an opinion delivered by Justice Scalia, the Court reviewed 
California’s Discover Bank rule,55 and directly addressed the issue of adhesive arbitration 
contracts and class arbitration waivers.56 When the Concepcions purchased AT&T service, 
they received what they thought were free cellphones.57 However, after they were charged 
sales tax based on the phones’ retail value, the Concepcions filed a complaint in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of California, which was later consolidated 
with a putative class action.58 AT&T moved to compel arbitration under the terms of its 
contract with the Concepcions. 59  The Concepcions contended that the arbitration 
agreement was “unconscionable and unlawfully exculpatory under California law because 
it disallowed class-wide procedures.” 60  Relying on the California Supreme Court’s 
decision in Discover Bank v. Superior Court,61 the district court found that the arbitration 
                                                 
50 Id. at 684. 
51 Stolt-Neilsen, 559 U.S. at 687. 
52 Aronovsky, supra note 36, at 156. 
53 Id.  
54 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
55 Id. at 341; see generally Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005) (the Discover Bank rule 
is a rule which classifies class arbitration waivers in adhesive consumer arbitration agreements as 
unconscionable and therefore unenforceable under California law). 
56 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 336. 
57 Id. at 337. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 337-38. 
61 Discover Bank, 36 Cal. 4th at 149 (finding a class action waiver to be an exculpatory clause, in violation of 
Cal. Civ. Code § 1668, and unenforceable under California Law).  
agreement was unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable.62 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, 
agreeing that the Discover Bank rule was not preempted by the FAA.63  
 The Court, in a 5-4 opinion, reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the FAA 
preempted the Discover Bank rule.64 In doing so, the Court held “for the first time . . . that 
the FAA preempted the application of a state contract law rule that on its face did not target 
arbitration.”65 The Court reasoned that while the FAA section 2 savings clause allows 
arbitration agreements to be invalidated by generally applicable state contract law defenses, 
those state laws may not disfavor arbitration or stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
of the FAA’s objectives.66 With this holding, the Court not only ruled that the practice of 
including class arbitration waivers is a lawful exercise of bargaining power, but also that 
adhesive contracts are a lawful means of bargaining.67 
 The Court most notably utilized Concepcion in American Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Restaurant,68 where it again upheld an adhesive arbitration agreement with a class 
arbitration waiver. 69  In this Second Circuit case, merchants who accepted American 
Express cards for customer purchases filed a class action lawsuit against the credit card 
company, claiming violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.70 The merchants filed suit 
despite the language of the contractual agreement, which required them to resolve disputes 
by arbitration and waived class actions.71  
 The Second Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision to dismiss the lawsuit, 
holding that, because the merchants would lose money arbitrating their claims individually, 
the class action waiver was prohibitive and unenforceable.72 The Supreme Court then 
reversed the Second Circuit, holding that the FAA does not permit courts to invalidate an 
                                                 
62 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 338. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 352. 
65 Aronovsky, supra note 36, at 166.  
66 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 341-342 (“When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of 
claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA . . . nothing in [§ 2] 
suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s 
objectives.”). 
67 Id. at 344-46, 348. 
68 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013). 
69 Id. at 2312. 
70 Italian Colors, 133 S.Ct. at 2308; 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
71 Italian Colors, 133 S.Ct. at 2308. 
72 Italian Colors Rest. v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. (In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig.), 667 F.3d 
204, 218-20 (2d Cir. 2012). 
arbitration contract on the grounds the Second Circuit relied on.73 Justice Scalia, writing 
for the majority, stated that “AT&T Mobility all but resolves this case.”74  Requiring a 
federal court to determine the possible costs and recoveries of a claim before a plaintiff can 
be held to his arbitration contract would “undoubtedly destroy the prospect of a speedy 
resolution that arbitration . . . was meant to secure.”75 
 These four cases, together, established the legality and enforceability of adhesive 
arbitration clauses containing class arbitration waivers in employment and consumer 
contracts. This expansive interpretation of the FAA’s preemptive authority over state 
contract law and arbitration procedure rules minimized the roles of lawmakers and judges 
in arbitration, and strengthened the federal policy favoring arbitration.76 
IV.  THE POLITICS OF ARBITRATION  
 It is essential to understand the political divide on this issue in order to understand 
how the 2016 election will impact the future of arbitration jurisprudence. This can be 
accomplished by simply looking at the voting breakdown and analyzing the content of the 
dissenting opinions in these important Supreme Court adhesive arbitration decisions. In 
Stolt-Nielsen, Justice Alito delivered the opinion, joined by Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy and 
Thomas.77 Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Stevens and Breyer, with 
Sotomayor taking no part in the case. 78  In her dissent, Ginsburg disagreed with the 
majority, writing that the Court erred in addressing an issue not ripe for judicial review, 
substituted its judgment for that of the decision-makers chosen by the parties, and ignored 
the strict limitations that the FAA places on judicial review of arbitral awards. 79  She 
criticized the Court for “not persuasively justify[ing] judicial intervention so early in the 
game or convincingly reconcil[ing] its adjudication with the firm final-judgment rule 
prevailing in the federal court system.”80 More importantly, in dicta at the end of her 
                                                 
73 Italian Colors, 133 S.Ct. at 2312. 
74 Id.  
75 Id.  
76 See Aronovsky, supra note 36, at 133-134. 
77 Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. 662. 
78 Id. 
79 Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 688 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
80 Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 692 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“No decision of this Court, until today, has ever 
approved immediate judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision as preliminary as the “partial award” made in 
this case.”). 
opinion she wrote of the importance of class arbitration in allowing claimants to effectively 
vindicate their rights.81 
 In Concepcion, Justice Scalia delivered the opinion, in which Roberts, Kennedy, 
Thomas and Alito joined.82 Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor and Kagan joined.83 Breyer’s dissent defended Discover Bank, noting that the 
rule did not create a blanket policy against waivers, but rather applies a more general 
principle.84 He argued that the Discover Bank rule, as well as class arbitration, is consistent 
with the FAA.85 He stated that “class arbitration is consistent with the use of arbitration . . 
. [and] is a form of arbitration that is well known in California and followed elsewhere.”86 
In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors, Justice Scalia again delivered the 
majority opinion, in which Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito joined.87 Kagan penned 
the dissent, in which Ginsburg and Breyer joined, with Sotomayor taking no part in the 
case.88 Kagan called the majority’s decision a “betrayal of our precedents, and of federal 
statues,”89 and argued that the Court ignored past decisions in not applying the effective 
vindication doctrine90 to this case and erroneously applied Concepcion.91 She argued that 
the ruling allows monopolists to use their power to deprive consumers of all legal recourse, 
thereby insulating themselves from antitrust liability.92 This outcome led Kagan to deliver 
a scathing analysis of the majority’s stance on arbitration, in which she stated that “[i]n the 
                                                 
81 Id. at 699. 
82 Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333. 
83 Id. at 357 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
84 Id. at 358-59 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Discover Bank rule does not create a ‘blanket policy in 
California against class action waivers in the consumer context.’ . . . Instead, it represents the ‘application of 
a more general [unconscionability] principle.’ . . . Courts applying California law have enforced class-action 
waivers where they satisfy general unconscionability standards.”). 
85 Id. at 359 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that “the Discover Bank rule is consistent with the federal Act’s 
language,” as well as the basic purpose behind the act). 
86 Id. at 361-62. 
87 Italian Colors, 133 S.Ct. 2304. 
88 Id. at 2313. 
89 Id.  
90 Id. (The effective vindication doctrine is a mechanism that prevents arbitration clauses from “choking off 
a plaintiff’s ability to enforce congressionally created rights” by barring the application of such a clause when 
it “operates to confer immunity from potentially meritorious federal claims.”). 
91 Id. at 2313, 2317, 2319-20 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
92 Italian Colors, 133 S.Ct. at 2313-14 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
hands of today’s majority, arbitration threatens to become . . . a mechanism easily made to 
block the vindication of meritorious federal claims and insulate wrongdoers from 
liability.”93 
 What can be extrapolated from the voting breakdown and content of the dissenting 
opinions is that the Court is divided along ideological lines when it comes to adhesive 
arbitration agreements and class action waivers.94 And as happens so often, this ideological 
split coincides with politics.95 With the majority in Stolt-Neilsen, Concepcion and Italian 
Colors consisting of the four conservative justices (Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Roberts) 
and moderate Justice Kennedy,96 and the dissent consisting of the four liberal justices 
(Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor), it appears that arbitration has become a truly 
political issue.97 This dynamic makes the Office of the President very important to the 
future of the law of arbitration.  
V.  THE NEW COURT 
 Donald Trump has promised to “[a]ppoint justices to the United States Supreme 
Court who will uphold our laws and our Constitution,” and has stated that “The 
replacement for Justice Scalia will be a person of similar views and principles who will 
uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States.” 98  This is the Trump 
administration’s broad criteria for Supreme Court nominees, taken directly from President 
Trump’s campaign website.  On January 31, 2017, within his first two weeks in office, 
President Trump nominated 10th Circuit Judge Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court.99 Judge 
Gorsuch was confirmed by the Senate on April 7, 2017, to become the 113th justice of the 
                                                 
93 Id. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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Supreme Court.100 Gorsuch is an originalist in the mold of the late Justice Scalia101 with an 
undeniably impressive resume, which includes clerking for both Justice Byron R. White 
and Justice Kennedy.102 Gorsuch is the youngest nominee to the Supreme Court in 25 years 
at only 49 years old, and could serve on the court for decades.103 
 In his opinions on cases involving arbitration, Gorsuch has exhibited an adherence 
to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FAA. In Howard v. Ferrellgas Partners, 
L.P.,104 Gorsuch wrote that “Congress has chosen to preempt state laws that aim to channel 
disputes into litigation rather than arbitration,”105 and cited Concepcion in the opening 
paragraph when emphasizing that it is a “‘fundamental principle’ [of the FAA] that 
‘arbitration is a matter of contract.’”106 While much is yet to be determined, Gorsuch’s 
record and ideological approach make it more likely than not that he will rule in a manner 
consistent with the Court’s conservatives on employment and consumer arbitration issues. 
VI.  HOW TRUMP APPOINTEES WILL SHAPE THE FUTURE OF ARBITRATION  
 As stated above, the main impact of the 2016 Election on consumer and 
employment arbitration is the prospect of a right-leaning court. The late Justice Scalia 
penned the majority opinions on the two most important cases in this area in the last decade, 
Concepcion and Italian Colors.107 Having his seat filled by a like-minded thinker like 
Gorsuch will likely lead to very different results than if the seat were filled by a more left 
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leaning judge.108 While Merrick Garland109 or a Hillary Clinton appointee may have been 
more likely to join an opinion that would reverse some of the aforementioned cases, it is 
unlikely that any conservative Trump appointee will break from the political and 
ideological lines on this issue.110 Rather, Justice Gorsuch and any future Trump appointees 
will likely uphold prior precedent set by the Roberts Court, and continue to strengthen the 
already strong federal policy favoring arbitration.111  
 A great way to see how this impacts future consumer and employment arbitration 
jurisprudence would be to look at how a current circuit split will likely be decided. Luckily, 
the Court recently granted certiorari and will address a circuit split between the Second, 
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits involving employment arbitration.112 The issue 
in this circuit split involves the larger debate over adhesive arbitration and class action 
waivers, but with a slight complexity that the Court has not yet addressed: whether 
mandatory employee arbitration agreements with class action waivers are enforceable 
under the FAA, notwithstanding the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act 
(hereinafter NLRA).113 This case will require the court to further analyze this issue under 
the savings clause114 of the FAA.115 
 The National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter Board) has repeatedly concluded 
in recent decisions that §§ 7 and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, and §§ 2 and 3 of the Norris-La 
Guardia Act,116 foreclose enforcement of arbitration agreements that waive an employee’s 
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right to pursue legal claims in any judicial or arbitral forum on a class action basis.117 The 
Fifth and Eighth Circuits have reversed the Board’s rulings, holding that the class waivers 
are enforceable.118 Those courts found that class actions waivers are compatible with the 
NLRA, and that the savings clause is not a basis for invalidating class waivers in this 
context because requiring the availability of class actions is inconsistent with the FAA.119 
 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have sided with the Board, holding that such 
agreements are not enforceable because they violate the NLRA, and are thus invalid under 
the savings clause.120 Those courts did not find the conflict between the NLRA and the 
FAA regarding class waivers that the Fifth and Seventh Circuits found under 
Concepcion.121 Rather, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits resolved the issue under the savings 
clause, holding that an illegal arbitration agreement under the NLRA meets the criteria to 
be unenforceable under the savings clause.122  
 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari for Lewis,123consolidated with Morris,124 
and Murphy Oil USA.125 In this case, the court will address the circuit split, deciding 
whether employment arbitration agreements with class waivers violate the NLRA, whether 
the NLRA and FAA are consistent, and then whether those agreements are unenforceable 
under the savings clause.126 One can certainly assume based on prior precedent that this 
will be another arbitration case with a majority and dissent divided along political lines.127 
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When considering the two possible outcomes in light of the 2016 election, the impact of 
Trump’s victory is clear – a conservative majority created by Trump’s appointment of Neil 
Gorsuch will likely reverse the Ninth Circuit, protecting the enforcement of class action 
waivers and strengthening the already strong federal policy favoring arbitration. 128  If 
Hillary Clinton had won, Garland or another liberal justice would have been more likely 
than the current court to affirm the Ninth Circuit, subsequently creating an avenue for 
courts to utilize the savings clause of the FAA to invalidate class waivers that violate the 
NLRA, and possibly other statutes. 129 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 The 2016 presidential election will certainly impact the country and world in 
countless ways. One of the many powers granted to the president is the power to nominate 
Justices of the Supreme Court.130 The Supreme Court was one of the more important issues 
to voters in 2016, possibly being the driving force behind some votes.129 This is 
understandable considering that the Court is often presented with the country’s most 
pressing and polarizing issues, and the composition of the court can greatly effect the 
outcomes of cases involving such issues.131  While arbitration may not be one of the more 
talked-about issues today, it is increasingly political, and the Court will hear arbitration-
related cases. A Republican victory will bring with it conservative justices to fill any 
vacancies. What this means for arbitration is two fold: a probable rejection of the liberal 
view on adhesive arbitration agreements and class action waivers, and strengthening of the 
already strong federal policy favoring arbitration. 
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